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Abstract This paper analyses the differences between national and international
innovation cooperation in five European countries: Belgium, Germany, Norway,
Portugal and Switzerland. We find that absorptive capacity, incoming spillovers, appro-
priability and risk-sharing are more important in an international context. Further-
more innovation performance is positively influenced by international cooperation, but
remains unaffected by national cooperation. Despite the heterogeneity of the investi-
gated countries, we find similar determinants and impacts of innovation cooperation.
Keywords National innovation cooperation · International innovation cooperation ·
Innovation performance
JEL Classification O30
1 Introduction
This paper analyses the differences between national and international innovation
cooperation1 with respect to their determinants and their impact on innovation per-
formance. The interest in the cooperation behaviour of firms stems from the growing
importance of innovation networks and the increasing openness of firm boundaries in
the innovation process.
1 In the text below ‘cooperation’ denotes always ‘innovation cooperation’.
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In order to keep up with the pace of the markets and to remain competitive, it is
often no longer sufficient to rely only on in-house innovation, but becomes increasingly
important to make the borders of the firms permeable. In particular, the relevance of
cooperation with partners from other countries is increasing due to the ongoing glob-
alisation of production and development processes. But while the promotion of inter-
national cooperation constitutes an important goal of technology policy especially of
the European Union [see, e.g., Vonortas (2000) and Hagedoorn et al. (2000); see also
Boardman and Gray (2010)], our understanding of the differences between national
and international cooperation agreements with respect to their determinants and their
impacts remains incomplete.
This paper attempts to investigate the differences between national and interna-
tional cooperation. To this end, we analyse the cooperation behaviour of innova-
tive firms in five European countries: Belgium, Germany, Norway, Portugal and
Switzerland. This heterogeneous sample of countries varies with respect to size,
degree of openness, innovation performance and cultural background. The database
consists of Community Innovation Survey (CIS3) data for the EU member states
and Norway. For Switzerland the data were collected through a comparable sur-
vey.
We investigate cooperation agreements along the dimension of national versus inter-
national cooperation. More concretely, in a first step, we analyse the determinants of
national and international cooperation by estimating two probit models that use dummy
variables that indicate national and international cooperation, respectively. In the
second step, we estimate a tobit model that uses the share of sales that are generated by
innovative products as dependent variable. The independent variables include dummy
variables for exclusive national cooperation and for international cooperation. We
address endogeneity using an instrumental variable approach.
The paper extends the existing empirical work concerning innovation cooperation
in two ways: First, we complement existing research by specifying separate equa-
tions for the determinants of national and international cooperation and their impact
on innovation performance. We also account for potential endogeneity of cooperative
agreements in the innovation equation. Second, our analysis comprises five Euro-
pean countries, thereby allowing an assessment of the validity of our findings across
countries and an analysis of differences between countries.
The set-up of the paper is as follows: In Sect. 2 of the paper the conceptual
framework and related empirical literature is presented. The data and some country
characteristics are briefly described in Sect. 3. Section 5 presents the model specifi-
cation and the estimation procedure. In Sect. 5 the empirical results are discussed and
Sect. 6 concludes the paper.
2 Conceptual Framework and Literature Review
2.1 Preliminary Remarks
The following discussion of the conceptual framework concerning the determinants of
innovation cooperation is based on three literature strands. The industrial organisation
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(IO) literature analyses the incentives that are created by incoming and outgoing spill-
overs [see Kaiser (2002) and De Bondt (1996) for reviews]. The second strand orig-
inates from the management literature and discusses potential motives for innovation
cooperation [see Caloghirou et al. (2003) for a review]. Third, the regional innova-
tion systems literature focuses on the characteristics of spillovers [Simmie (2004)
provides a review]. The final paragraphs of the section discuss the existing litera-
ture on the impact of cooperation on innovation output and present our hypothe-
ses.
2.2 Absorptive Capacity and Knowledge Spillovers
An important strand of the IO literature is concerned with endogenous absorptive
capacity, which is the ability to exploit externally generated knowledge: knowledge
that is generated by competitors, suppliers, customers, and/or public research institu-
tions and universities (Cohen and Levinthal 1989, 1990). Firms with well-educated
staff and permanent research activities are supposed to have higher absorptive capacity
than do firms that lack such characteristics.
The concept of incoming spillovers (see Cassiman and Veugelers 2002) is strongly
related to the absorptive capacity of a firm. It indicates the “amount” of exploit-
able external knowledge that flows into the firm. The type of cooperation partner is
an important characteristic that can affect the extent of such spillover effects in a
cooperative project. In cooperative agreements with universities or research organi-
zations, maximizing incoming spillovers is important for a cooperating firm. When
collaborating with other enterprises (suppliers, customers or competitors) in addition
to exploiting incoming spillovers cooperating firms are also interested in minimizing
outgoing spillovers.
Outgoing spillovers measure the amount of a firm’s knowledge that seeps out of
the firm and can be utilised by other firms. While incoming spillovers may motivate
a firm to seek Research and Development (R&D) cooperation, outgoing spillovers
exert the opposite influence: They hinder innovative activities because of the risk
of internal knowledge leaking out to competitors. The negative effects of outgoing
spillovers can be attenuated through several formal (e.g., by ensuring property rights
through patents) and informal (e.g., secrecy, lead time over competitors, complexity
of developed products) appropriability mechanisms.
There is an inherent relationship between these three concepts: Absorptive capacity
is necessary for a firm in order to be able to exploit available external knowledge: to
ensure knowledge flows to the firm (incoming spillovers). But the firm also protects
its own knowledge base from being exploited by other firms or institutions without
paying for it, thus controlling outgoing spillovers, e.g., through various protection
mechanisms.
Innovation cooperation, particularly in the form of joint ventures, is an impor-
tant single knowledge acquisition strategy, which has been the subject of theoret-
ical and empirical analysis since some years. Economic research in the field of
R&D cooperation essentially aims at understanding why firms are undertaking such
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cooperation, how they do it, and with what result [see Kaiser (2002), and De Bondt
(1996), for reviews of this literature].
Probably the most influential theoretical paper in this field is that of D’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988). They derived a two-stage Cournot duopoly game in which firms
decide upon R&D investment and then compete in the product market. R&D expendi-
tures are larger in research joint ventures than in the competition case if (exogenous)
spillovers exceed a critical value.
Kamien et al. (1992) generalize the framework of D’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988). Relevant key findings of this paper are that: (a) An increase in spillovers tends
to reduce incentives to collaborate in R&D; (b) An increase in market demand leads
to an increase of research efforts; (c) An increase of market demand fosters R&D
cooperation; and (d) Increased research productivity leads to increased incentives to
invest in R&D and also to cooperate.
Using data from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) for different European
countries, Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), Belderbos et al. (2004a), Bönte and Keil-
bach (2005), Schmidt (2005), Miotti and Sachwald (2003) and Abramovsky et al.
(2009) provide empirical evidence that supports the notion that absorptive capacity
and the extent of incoming and extent of outgoing spillovers have the expected effects
on the likelihood of innovation cooperation. Moreover, analyzing national and interna-
tional cooperation separately Faria and Schmidt (2007) find little evidence for differ-
ences between national and international cooperation with respect to these variables.
2.3 Cost- and Risk-Sharing Motives
The second branch of literature to be taken into consideration is research on the
motives of international firm alliances in management economics (see, e.g., Glaister
and Buckley 1996). The most relevant motive in this context is the realisation of syner-
gies by transferring complementary technology. Another motive is to share innovation
risks.
However, while Belderbos et al. (2004a) find a positive significant coefficient for
a variable that measurs innovation risk, the risk-sharing motive appears to be of no
relevance in Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), Bönte and Keilbach (2005), Schmidt
(2005) and Miotti and Sachwald (2003). A potential explanation could be that the
positive effect for international cooperation is disguised by the insignificant effect for
national cooperation in empirical estimates that do not distinguish between these two
types of cooperation.
Furthermore, Glaister and Buckley (1996) argue that firms might cooperate to
share costs and thereby realise economies of scale. The empirical results of Cassi-
man and Veugelers (2002), Bönte and Keilbach (2005), and Schmidt (2005) support
this hypothesis. Miotti and Sachwald (2003) augment the hypothesis arguing that the
cost-sharing motive is more important for national than for international cooperation.
Firms might enter innovation cooperation in order to attract governmental funding.
Since the acquisition of funding by foreign governments requires specific knowledge
about local funding schemes, international cooperation reduces information costs.
123
A Comparison of National and International Innovation Cooperation 167
Furthermore, there are many funding schemes that require firms to enter an interna-
tional cooperation agreement (see, e.g., Czarnitzki and Fier 2003).
A further motive for international cooperation that is discussed in the management
economics literature is that spillovers and synergies might be larger in the international
context. Potential reasons for larger spillovers could be the likelihood that international
partners might be closer to the technological frontier than are national partners (Miotti
and Sachwald 2003) and the necessity of applying location-specific technology (see,
e.g., Li and Zhong 2003).
2.4 The Role of the Regional Dimension
The third literature strand—the economics of regional innovation systems—investi-
gates geographic innovation clusters and the role of technological spillovers in this
context (see, e.g., Leamer and Storper 2001; Sonn and Storper 2008).
An early explanation for the formation of such clusters is that innovation activities
require flexible inputs and a high degree of communication that can be achieved
only in urban areas (Vernon 1966). The existence of local spillovers provides
an alternative explanation: The transfer of uncodifiable and complex knowledge
requires trust and understanding among cooperation partners that can be developed
more effectively through face-to-face contacts (Simmie 2004; Storper and Venables
2004).
The findings of Lindelöf and Löfsten (2004) support the relevance of informal con-
tacts for university-industry linkages. Furthermore, Aldieri and Cincera (2009) as well
as Bottanzi and Peri (2003) provide empirical evidence for the local nature of spill-
overs: Regional but not interregional spillovers show a positive impact on productivity
growth.
The general impression from this literature is that incoming spillovers are more
important for intra-regional (national) than inter-regional (international) cooperation.
The implications with respect to outgoing spillovers and hence appropriability are
ambiguous: While outgoing spillovers appear to be larger in the national context, trust
might provide an alternative mechanism to secrecy and/or legal protection thus raising
knowledge appropriabilty for a given level of outgoing spillovers. Since trust is harder
to achieve in the international context, appropriability that is based on legal protection
and/or secrecy might be more important in the international context despite the smaller
magnitude of outgoing spillovers.
However, Waxell and Malmberg (2007) observe that while the Uppsala biotech
cluster is locally anchored, it has strong links to the world as well. Bathelt et al. (2003)
see these interregional connections as network pipelines that mitigate the lock-in effect
that may be created by high levels of geographic concentration (see, e.g., Boschma
2005). Such pipelines work through functional proximity rather than geographic prox-
imity (Cooke 2006). Similarily, Morgan (1997), Hart and Simmie (1997), and Wolfe
and Gertler (2004) stress the relevance of interregional and international pipelines for
innovation.
Maskell et al. (2006) add a further aspect to this perspective by pointing out the rele-
vance of temporary clusters—for example, international professional gatherings—for
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the creation of trust that is needed to complement the functional proximity. On the
whole, this part of the regional innovation systems literature emphasises in accordance
with the management economics literature the relevance of spillovers (and synergies)
in the international context.
2.5 The Impact of Cooperation on Innovation Performance
In sum, existing literature seems to provide conflicting views as to the role of spill-
overs in the national and international context with respect to both the effect on the
likelihood of cooperation and the impact on innovation output and productivity.
Empirical evidence is also mixed.2 A number of empirical studies have found a
positive impact of engaging in innovation cooperation on innovation performance,
which is usually measured by the sales share of innovative products [see, e.g., Klomp
and van Leeuwen (2001), Lööf and Heshmati (2002); and Belderbos et al. (2004b)].
However, other studies find little evidence for a significant correlation between innova-
tion cooperation and innovation performance (e.g., Kemp et al. 2003; Janz et al. 2003).
Moreover, the existing evidence with respect to the differences between national
and international innovation cooperation remains inconclusive as well. Namely, Miotti
and Sachwald (2003) show that in France innovation performance is not affected by
innovation cooperation agreements with national partners but is positively influenced
by cooperation with foreign partners. Similarly, Lööf (2009) finds that the presence
of foreign cooperation partners in the network has a positive effect on innovation per-
formance. However, Lööf and Heshmati (2002) find positive effects on innovation for
both partner types and Jaklic et al. (2008) find positive effects of national but not of
international innovation cooperation for Slovenian firms.
2.6 Research Hypotheses
Based on the literature discussed above, we formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Absorptive capacity exerts a positive influence on the likelihood of
cooperation.
Hypothesis 2 Incoming spillovers exert a positive influence on the likelihood of
cooperation.
Hypothesis 3 Appropriability exerts a positive influence on the likelihood of
cooperation.
Given the existing theoretical and empirical literature we have no specific a pri-
ori expectations as to the effects of absorptive capacity and incoming and outgoing
2 Nevertheless, subjective measures of cooperation performance obtained from a broad survey of European
countries (Caloghirou and Vonortas 2000) showed a wide spectrum of expected benefits, primarily from
international research joint ventures: acquisition and/or creation of new knowledge, development of new
products, improvement of the technological capabilities of participating firm, etc. (see also Caloghirou et al.
2003).
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Table 1 Population size, sample size and response rate by country
Country Firms in population Firms in sample Response rate
in %
Observations used
in estimations
Belgium 13,827 4,482 47 428
Switzerland 56,722 6,000 40 980
Germany 117,979 13,642 21 1,314
Norway 9,316 3,796 96 1,068
Portugal 23,816 4,097 na 460
Source: Lucking (2004)
spillovers separately for national and international cooperation. It is expected that the
empirical comparative analysis would cast more light on this issue.
Hypothesis 4 Innovation risks exert a positive influence on the likelihood of cooper-
ation.
Hypothesis 4a Innovation risks as a determinant of the likelihood of cooperation are
more important for international than for national cooperation.
Hypothesis 5 Financial constraints exert a positive influence on the likelihood of coop-
eration
Hypothesis 5a Financial constraints as a determinant of the likelihood of cooperation
are more important for national than international cooperation
According to the theoretical arguments and existing empirical evidence the effect of
innovation cooperation on innovation performance is not a priori clear.
3 Data Description
The data for Belgium, Germany, Norway, and Portugal were collected in the course
of the Third Community Innovation Survey (CIS3), which covered the period 1998–
2000 and were available as micro-aggregated data in the form that is usually provided
by Eurostat. The questionnaire that was used was based on the Oslo manual (OECD
1997). Sample reliability of the CIS data is ensured by the sampling procedure that
is described in Eurostat (2001). The Swiss data are from the Swiss Innovation Sur-
vey 2002, which covered the period 2000–2002 and referred to R&D-active firms.
The underlying questionnaire was also based on the Oslo manual [see Arvanitis and
Hollenstein (2004) for the sample construction].3
Table 1 provides information on the number of firms in the population and the
sample as well as the response rates and the number of observations without miss-
ing values due to item-non-response for each country. Response rates vary between
3 Thus, there is a comparability problem of the Swiss data that we consider not to be serious given that
many characteristics of cooperation behaviour have structural character, at least for the short period of time
taken into account in this study.
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Table 2 Composition of the sample by sector, firm size and type of innovation cooperation
BE CH DE NO PT
N % N % N % N % N %
By sector:
Mining, construction and energy 5 1 61 6 30 2 60 6 10 2
Consumer goods 42 10 63 6 94 7 139 13 91 20
Intermediate goods 111 26 193 20 299 23 199 19 123 27
Investment goods 129 30 415 42 503 38 333 31 134 29
Traditional services 61 14 130 13 190 14 132 12 62 13
Knowledge-based services 80 19 118 12 198 15 205 19 40 9
By firm size in employees:
Small (10–49) 180 42 386 39 431 33 469 44 152 33
Medium (50–249) 148 35 415 42 458 35 195 18 145 32
Large (250 and more) 100 23 179 18 425 32 404 38 163 35
By type of innovation cooperation:
No cooperation 297 69 789 81 906 69 589 55 343 75
National cooperation 39 9 62 6 227 17 223 21 66 14
National and international cooperation 92 21 129 13 181 14 256 24 51 11
Total 428 100 980 100 1,314 100 1,068 100 460 100
The sector definitions refer to the following 2-digit NACE codes: mining, construction, energy (10–14 and
40–41); consumer goods (SECTOR_2; 15–19), intermediate goods (SECTOR_3; 20–27); investment goods
(SECTOR_4; 28–37); traditional services (excluding hotels and restaurants) (SECTOR_5; 50–52; 60–64);
knowledge-based services (SECTOR_6; 72–74)
21 % for Germany and 96 % for Norway. For all countries we restrict the sample to
firms with 10 and more employees. Furthermore, the data sets contain only innovating
firms. Therefore, our inferences refer only to innovating firms. In addition, we elimi-
nate financial intermediaries from our sample as well as observations that indicate an
R&D or investment intensity above one. Finally, we drop observations of firms that
conduct international but not national innovation cooperation to facilitate the inter-
pretation of our cooperation variables. Table 2 shows the composition of the data sets
that are used in this study for all five countries by sector, firm size class and type of
innovation cooperation.
Table 3 provide the definitions of the variables that are used in this study. Table 4
contains descriptive statistics of the used variables; and Table 5 shows the correla-
tions between the model variables. Country-specific descriptive statistics and cross-
correlations are available upon request.
4 Model Specification and Estimation Procedure
4.1 Specification of the Cooperation Equations
The fact that many firms are engaged at the same time in both types of cooperation leads
to the problem of interdependence between national and international cooperation,
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Table 3 Definition of the variables of the cooperation equation
Variables Description
Dependent variables
First equation
COOP_NAT_INT 0: no cooperation; 1: only national cooperation; 2: also international cooperation
Second equation
NEWS Sales share of new or significantly improved products in %
Independent variables
Absorptive capacity
FEPT Innovation expenditures divided by sales (Switzerland: R&D expenditures)
OSKILL Dummy variablea; 1: lack of qualified personnel is an important innovation
obstacle; 0: otherwise
Incoming spillovers
SPILLIN Dummy variableb; 1: high relevance of customers, suppliers of materials
and capital goods and universities reflects as innovation-relevant external
knowledge resource; 0: otherwise
Appropriability
APPR Dummy variablec; 1: any of the following means to protect inventions or
innovations were used: patents; design patterns; trademarks; copyright;
0: otherwise
Proxies for risk- and cost sharing
ORISK Dummy variablea; 1: risks of innovation projects are an important
innovation obstacle; 0: otherwise
OFIN Dummy variablea; 1: difficulty to access to financial sources is an
important innovation obstacle; 0: otherwise
Cooperation variables (for second equation)
NATCOOP Dummy variable; 1: firms that have co-operation arrangements with other
firms or organisations (only national partners); 0 otherwise
INTCOOP Dummy variable; 1: firms that have co-operation arrangements with other
firms or organisations (also international partners); 0: otherwise
Control variables
INVPT Gross investment divided by sales
PUBFIN Dummy variable for public financial support in the respective reference
period
GROUP Dummy variable; 1: firm is part of an enterprise group; 0: firm is
independent
FOREIGN Dummy variabled; 1: firm with foreign headquarter; 0: otherwise
MARKET_2 Dummy variable; 1: firm operating primarily in a national market; 0:
otherwise
MARKET_3 Dummy variable; 1: firm operating primarily in an international market; 0:
otherwise
SIZE_2; SIZE_3 Dummy variables; 1: 50 to 249 employees; 0: otherwise and 1: 250
employees and more; 0: otherwise, respectively; reference group: firms
with 10–49 employees
which can be addressed econometrically by estimating a multinomial probit model
that is based on a dependent variable referring to exclusive groups of firms. To this
end, we constructed the nominal variable COOP_NAT_INT (0: no cooperation; 1:
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Table 3 continued
Variables Description
SECTOR_2-SECTOR_7 7 sectoral dummies; see Table 2 for the definitions; reference group:
mining, construction, energy
a The dummy variable takes the value 1 if a firm reports the values 3 or 4 and the value 0 if a firm reports
the values 1 or 2 on a four-point Likert scale (1: ‘not relevant’: 4: ‘high importance’); Switzerland: the
dummy takes the value 1 if a firm reports 4 or 5 and the value 0 if a firm reports 1, 2 or 3 on a five-point
Likert scale (1; ‘not important’; 5: very important’); b the dummy variable takes the value 1 if the average
score of the relevance of customers, suppliers of materials and capital goods and universities as sources
of innovation-relevant information is higher than 4; the importance of each single source is measured on
four(five)-point Likert scale; c for Switzerland, the dummy variable takes the value 1 if a firm reports that
the relevance of innovation protection measures takes the value 4 or 5 and 0 otherwise; d for Switzerland
the dummy variable takes the value 1 if the firm is foreign-owned
Table 4 Summary statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
NATCOOP 4,250 0.1451765 0.3523201 0 1
INTCOOP 4,250 0.1668235 0.3728621 0 1
NEWS (%) 4,250 24.54781 25.17792 0 100
FEPT 4,250 0.05945 0.1170298 0 0.989
OSKILL 4,250 0.4011765 0.4901943 0 1
SPILLIN 4,250 0.4136471 0.4925447 0 1
APPR 4,250 0.5990588 0.4901468 0 1
ORISK 4,250 0.4738824 0.4993762 0 1
OFIN 4,250 0.3903529 0.4878868 0 1
INVPT 4,250 0.1446866 0.1903109 0 0.999
PUBFIN 4,250 0.2371765 0.4254014 0 1
GROUP 4,250 0.5124706 0.4999033 0 1
FOREIGN 4,250 0.1517647 0.3588349 0 1
MARKET_2 4,250 0.3682353 0.4823824 0 1
MARKET_3 4,250 0.3783529 0.4850333 0 1
only national cooperation; 2: also international cooperation) that serves as dependent
variable for the cooperation equation.
Our model contains variables that measure a firm’s knowledge absorptive capacity,
the availability of qualified personnel, incoming spillovers, appropriability, the extent
of innovation risks, the extent of financial constraints, a series of control variables
with respect to capital intensity, public promotion of innovation, affiliation to a group
of enterprises, type of market in which a firm operates, firm size and sector affiliation.
We measure absorptive capacity (FEPT) by the innovation expenditures inten-
sity: the ratio of innovation expenditures to sales (for Switzerland: R&D expendi-
tures/sales). Based on hypothesis 1, we expect a positive effect of this variable. We
use a variable for lack of qualified personnel (variable OSKILL) as an additional
measure that reflects absorptive capacity. For this variable we expect a negative effect.
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The variable serving as a proxy for incoming spillovers (SPILLIN) is based on
the average score (on a four-point Likert scale for all countries with the exception of
Switzerland, where a five-point scale is used) of the innovation relevance of knowledge
from customers, suppliers of material and capital goods and universities (on the whole:
four different sources). Following hypothesis 2, we expect a positive effect from this
variable, but remain agnostic with respect to the relative effects as to national and
international cooperation.
Outgoing spillovers (APPR) are proxied by a dummy variable that is constructed
on the basis of information on the availability and use of several legal means (patents,
design patterns, trademarks, and copyright) to protect innovation returns. For firms
that use such means extensively, we assume that the firms need them in order to protect
their knowledge from imitation and improve the appropriability of their innovation
revenues. But this kind of measure does not denote in itself much about the effec-
tiveness of these protection means. Unfortunately, measures of the effectiveness of
protection are not available in our dataset. If protection is effective, appropriability
is warranted and cooperation could not be harmful. If protection is ineffective, low
appropriability would be a problem for the firm and cooperation would be avoided.
In accordance with hypothesis 3, a positive sign of the variable would be interpreted
as support for the validity of the assumption that high appropriability (low level of
outgoing spillovers) is present, a negative sign would be a confirmation of the low
appropriability assumption (high level of outgoing spillovers).
Further, the management literature considers two additional motives for innovation
(R&D) cooperation: sharing of innovation risks, and sharing of innovation invest-
ment. As proxies for these two motives we use the variables ORISK, which refers to
the importance of innovation risks as an innovation obstacle and OFIN controlling for
lack of funds for innovation, respectively. Based on hypotheses 4 and 4a, we expect that
high innovation risks are a motivation for cooperation and that this effect is stronger
for international than for national cooperation. Furthermore, we expect lack of funds
for innovation to be an incentive rather for national than international cooperation as
described in the hypotheses 5 and 5a.
Several additional firm characteristics are also taken into account as control vari-
ables: the intensity of physical capital (INVPT), measured by the ratio of investment
expenditures to sales; whether a firm receives public financial support (PUBFIN);
whether a firm belongs to a group of enterprises (GROUP); and whether a firm is for-
eign or domestic (FOREIGN). For public support we expect a positive sign because
in most countries public support is tied to the condition of cooperative projects.
A positive sign is expected also for the variable GROUP. Firms that are embedded
in a network of sister firms would show a higher cooperation propensity than would
firms without such ties. It is not a priori clear if there are differences with respect to
cooperation behaviour between domestic and foreign firms. Finally, dummy variables
for market orientation (local, domestic, international), firm size (10–49, 50–249, 250
and more employees) and sector affiliation are included in the cooperation equations.
Hence, a formal expression of the probability that firm i cooperates with national /
international partners is as follows:
C O O P_N AT _I N Ti j = α0, j + α1, j F E PTi + α2, j O SK I L Li + α3, j S P I L L I Ni
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+α4, j AP P Ri + α5, j O RI SKi + α6, j O F I Ni
+α7, j I N V PTi + α8, j PU B F I Ni + α9, j G ROU Pi
+α10, j F O RE I G Ni + controlvariables
+ ui, j ; ( j=1 : onlynational; j=2 : alsointernational).
(1)
4.2 Specification of the Innovation Equation
Our innovation equation is specified on the basis of the resource-based firm concept
[see, e.g., Teece (1982) and Teece et al. (1997)]. Innovation performance (NEWS) is
measured by the sales share of new and considerably modified products (see Table 3).
As independent variables we use proxies for the intensity of innovation expenditures
(FEPT), investment intensity (INVPT), and a series of control variables for foreign
ownership, firm size and sector affiliation. Finally, we include also the cooperation
dummy variables (NATCOOP; INTCOOP).
We expect a positive effect of the two resource-related variables. According to the-
oretical arguments and existing empirical evidence the direction of the effects of the
two cooperation variables is not a priori clear. A formal expression of this equation
for a firm i is as follows:
N EW Si = β0 + β1 N AT C O O Pi + β2 I N T C O O Pi + β3 F E PTi
+β4 I N V PTi + β5 F O RE I G Ni + control variables + vi . (2)
In this second step, we estimate tobit models for Eq. (2), since NEWS, the dependent
variable, was downward censored at 0. Reported standard errors are heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors.
4.3 Endogeneity
Being involved in cooperation activities might not be exogenous to innovation
activities. Following Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), we tested the endogeneity of
three variables in the cooperation equations (FEPT, SPILLIN, APPR) and the two
cooperation variables in the innovation equation (NATCOOP, INTCOOP) according
to the following procedure (Rivers and Vuong 1988): Instrument equations were esti-
mated separately for each cooperation variable and each sample. Instrument choice was
based on a significant correlation with the endogenous variable and an insignificant
coefficient in a regression that includes both endogenous and instrumental variables.
The residuals of the first stage equations were inserted in the cooperation equations
and in the innovation equations respectively as additional regressors. Bootstrapping
was used in order to correct the standard errors of the estimated parameters.
If the coefficient of the residuals was statistically significant (at the 10 % test
level), we have assumed that endogeneity is present and consequently based our
inference on instrumented variables; also in this case standard errors were estimated
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by bootstrapping. In cases in which the coefficient of the residual was not statistically
significant, we have assumed exogeneity. Tables with the estimates of the instrumen-
tal equations, the results of the endogeneity tests, and the reduced form estimates are
available upon request.
The endogeneity tests for FEPT, SPILLIN, and APPR show that the null hypoth-
esis of exogeneity cannot be rejected. Endogeneity tests for NATCOOP and INT-
COOP reveal endogeneity for NATCOOP in Germany and Norway, while INTCOOP
is endogenous in all equations except for Belgium and Portugal. Therefore, we report
results based on instrumented variables in these cases. As instruments we used (a) the
2-digit industry means of four variables that measure the importance of the following
sources of external knowledge: suppliers (manufacturing; CH; DE); firms belonging
to the same group (CH); universities (pooled; manufacturing; services sector); and
public research institutions (pooled; NO); (b) the 2-digit industry means of two vari-
ables that measure the importance of the following obstacles of innovation: costs of
innovation (DE); and lack of market information (services sector); and (c) the 2-digit
industry means of the export shares of turnover (NO). All instrument variables fulfilled
the conditions for appropriate instruments that are mentioned in the first paragraph of
this section.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Cooperation Propensity
Table 6 summarizes the main results, and Tables 7 and 8 show the estimates of the
multinomial probit model for the exclusive categories ‘only national’ and ‘also inter-
national’ innovation cooperation with respect to the reference category (consisting of
firms that are not engaged in innovation cooperation). In addition to country results,
Tables 7 and 8 contain estimates of pooled regressions. Further, we report separate
estimates for the pooled manufacturing and the pooled service sector. The estimates
at country level are justified by the Chow-type likelihood ratio test, which rejects the
pooled model with a p value of 0.001. A further test rejected pooling sectors with a p
value of 0.02.
Supporting hypothesis 1, we find that absorptive capacity as measured by intensity
of innovation expenditures (FEPT) increases the likelihood of national cooperation
except for Portugal (no effect) and Belgium (negative effect). The insignificant mar-
ginal effect for pooled manufacturing indicates that the overall positive effect can be
traced back mainly to the services sector. The marginal effects become positively
significant in all equations that analyse international innovation cooperation with
the exception of Portugal. Furthermore, the effect is larger for international than for
national cooperation.
The measure for absorptive capacity that is related to human capital (OSKILL)
shows the expected negative sign in the regressions of national cooperation, but it is
statistically significant only at the more aggregate for the service sector and at the
country level only for Norway. Also in this case the expected negative effect is found
primarily in the pooled service sector. We found no effect for international cooperation.
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Thus, there is little support for hypothesis 1 coming from this variable, presumably
because of the nature of the proxy used that does not allow a direct measurement of
human capital endowment.
These results coincide with the findings of Woerter (2011) for Switzerland. Faria and
Schmidt (2007) find a significantly positive impact of human capital endowment for
both Germany and Portugal based on a different specification of this variable (dummy
variable with the value 1 when a firm has a share of employees with tertiary-level
education higher than the sample median).
In accordance with hypothesis 2, we find a significantly positive effect of incom-
ing spillovers (SPILLIN) for both national (only pooled manufacturing) and interna-
tional cooperation (both pooled sectors). At the county level, the effect for national
cooperation is significantly positive only for Germany and is negative for Norway,
though only marginally significant. For international cooperation, the effect is signifi-
cantly positive in all equations. Furthermore, the marginal effect is substantially larger
for international cooperation, which suggests that incoming spillovers are larger in the
international context.
Faria and Schmidt (2007) found no significant effect for their variable that mea-
sured overall incoming spillovers for Germany and Portugal. Abramovsky et al. (2009)
obtained a positive effect of incoming spillovers (also measured by an overall variable)
for Germany after taking into account the endogeneity of this variable.
In accordance with hypothesis 3 and the existing empirical evidence, the variable
for appropiability (APPR) generally shows a positive effect on cooperation. However,
in the case of national cooperation the variable for appropriability is statistically signif-
icant only for the pooled manufacturing sector, for which intellectual property rights
are in general more important than for the service sector. At the country level, only
the marginal effect for Germany is significantly positive. By contrast, the marginal
effects of the appropriability variable for international cooperation are throughout
positive and statistically significant.
We interpret the positive sign of this variable as evidence in favour of the assump-
tion of high appropriability (low level of outgoing spillovers) influencing positively
the cooperation propensity. This finding is also in accordance with the theoretical
expectation that appropriability that is based on legal protection or secrecy etc. is
more important for international than national cooperation (see Sect. 2).
The results for Germany and Portugal are in line with the findings of Faria and
Schmidt (2007) and those for Germany are also in accordance with Abramovsky et al.
(2009). The positive significant effect on national cooperation in Germany might
reflect the large size of the domestic economy, which provides firms with more pos-
sible sources of innovation-relevant information cooperation partners than do small
countries’ economies.
As expressed in hypotheses 4 and 4a, the theoretical expectation with respect
to innovation risk (as measured by the variable ORISK as a proxy for the risk-
sharing motive of cooperation) is that the perspective of risk-sharing increases the
cooperation propensity of firms, especially for international cooperation. In line with
the higher uncertainty in an international environment, we find partial evidence for
the presence of this positive effect in the context of international cooperation agree-
ments, as the variable ORISK is significant for manufacturing and for Switzerland.
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Miotti and Sachwald (2003), who use a similar variable in their study do not find a
strong relationship for France.
Obstacles with respect to the availability of financing (OFIN) serve as a proxy for
the cost-sharing motive for cooperation. It does not affect the decision to cooperate
significantly. However, we found a significantly positive effect for the pooled service
sector both for national and international cooperation. At the country level, only the
effect on national cooperation for Germany is significant. Hence, there is no confir-
mation for hypotheses 5 and 5a.
The positive effect of public finance support (variable PUBFIN) on the propensity
to cooperate both nationally and internationally for all countries reflects, even if it can-
not be causally interpreted, the common goal of technology policy in most countries
to foster cooperation by providing subsides under the condition of cooperation either
with universities or other firms.
In the group of variables that capture the market environment, operating in regional,
national or international markets does not make a difference for national cooperation
at country level with the exceptions of Switzerland, where firms that operate in interna-
tional markets show a lower propensity for national cooperation than firms operating
in regional markets and Portugal, where the marginal effect is positive. At more aggre-
gate level, we found that service firms with international orientation of their activities
in general tend to cooperate less at the national level than other firms. On the contrary,
firms operating in international markets show not astonishingly a significantly higher
inclination for international cooperation than firms with regional or national action
radius.
Furthermore, being a member of an enterprise group (variable GROUP) increases
the likelihood of cooperation, both at the national and international level. This effect is
stronger for international cooperation. In the regressions for the pooled, the manufac-
turing and services sample as well as in Norway and Portugal the variable FOREIGN
has a significantly negative sign, implying that the propensity to cooperate only at
a national level is lower for foreign firms. In Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany
there appears to be no difference between domestic and foreign firms with respect to
cooperative behaviour. Foreign firms show a higher propensity for international coop-
eration than do domestic firms. This effect could be found for pooled manufacturing
and for Norway at the country level.
Large firms with more than 250 employees cooperate within national borders more
frequently than do SMEs. For international cooperation, the marginal effect of the
dummy variable for larger firms is significantly positive in all countries and larger
than for national cooperation.
5.2 Innovation Output
In a second step we analyse the impact of innovation cooperation (instrumented, when
appropriate) on the innovation performance of firms by estimating a Tobit model,
where the dependent variable is the share of sales that are generated by innovative
(new and considerably modified) products. Also in this case a Chow-type likelihood
ratio test rejects pooling countries and sectors with p values of 0.000 and 0.008,
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Table 9 Innovation equations; summary results
Pooled Manuf Service BE CH GE NO PT
National cooperation ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns
International cooperation +*** +*** +*** ns +*** +** +*** +***
Instrumented NATCOOP variable for DE and NO and instrumented ITCOOP variable in all equations
except BE and PT; +/−: positive /negative coefficient, *, ** and *** denote statistically significance at the
10, 5 and 1 % test-level; ns: statistically insignificant at the 10 % test level
respectively. The results are summarised in Table 9, and the detailed results are found
in Table 10.
The results exhibit no evidence for an effect of the dummy variable for national
cooperation (NATCOOP) on innovation performance. International cooperation (INT-
COOP), on the other hand, is clearly positively correlated to innovation performance.
The coefficients are significantly positive in all regressions with the exception of that
for Belgium. There are no discernible differences between the manufacturing and the
sector service.
These results are in line with the findings of Miotti and Sachwald (2003) that
show that in France innovation performance is not affected by cooperation agree-
ments with national partners but is positively affected by cooperation with foreign
partners. Similarly, Lööf (2009) finds for Swedish firms that innovation performance
is positively affected by the presence of foreign cooperation partners in the network.
A possible explanation for this difference between national and international
cooperation may be given by different motives behind the two types of coopera-
tion. More knowledge-oriented motives (e.g., utilization of technological synergies;
access to specialized technology) could be expected to be primarily drivers of inter-
national cooperation because the likelihood to find such partners internationally is
higher than inside a single country, especially inside a small single country (Miotti
and Sachwald 2003). Moreover, such motives seem to enhance stronger innovation
performance than more cost-oriented motives (e.g., saving of R&D costs) that tend to
improve overall firm efficiency (Arvanitis 2008). If knowledge-oriented motives are
predominant in international cooperation, then it is not astonishing that the impact of
international cooperation on innovation shows to be significantly larger than that of
national cooperation.
In accordance with our expectations, the intensity of innovation or R&D expendi-
tures (FEPT) is positively correlated with the share of innovative products. Exceptions
are Belgium and Germany, where the coefficient is positive but insignificant.
As to the control variables, we find a counterintuitive negative effect for investment
intensity (INVPT) in the regressions for Norway and Portugal that render the effect
in the pooled and manufacturing equations negative as well. The variable remains
insignificant in the other regressions. This finding might reflect the specific indus-
try structure of Portugal and Norway, where oil refineries, cement production and
paper manufacturing are among the major industries; these are industries that are not
particularly innovative industries but quite investment-intensive. In four of the five
countries (except Germany) foreign firms are as innovative as are domestic firms.
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The effect of size is ambiguous, as it is positive in Belgium and negative in Switzer-
land, Germany and Norway.
6 Summary and Conclusions
Fostering innovation cooperation constitutes an important element of innovation
policy around the globe but especially in Europe. In order to select the optimal policy
instruments, politicians require information on both the determinants and the impact
of different cooperation forms. This paper adds to the literature by providing informa-
tion about determinants and impact of two major categories of innovation cooperation:
national and international cooperation, across 5 European countries. Tables 6 and 9
summarize the results.
With respect to the determinants of innovation cooperation, we find that absorp-
tive capacity, incoming spillovers, and high appropriability foster both national
and international cooperation, but the effect is more pronounced for international
cooperation. Risk-sharing as a motive of cooperation appears to be weak and
primarily for international cooperation. Cost-sharing has no relevance as a cooper-
ation motive. Finally, we find evidence that public support fosters cooperative behav-
iour, thereby supporting the potential effectiveness of public policy instruments in this
respect.
On the whole, despite the structural heterogeneity of the investigated countries, we
find similar determinants and impacts of innovation cooperation, although Chow-
like likelihood ratio tests indicated that the countries ought not to be pooled for
analysis. Greater differences are detected between the pooled manufacturing and the
pooled service sector, presumably due to sectoral differences in the nature of innova-
tions.
Our analysis of the impact of innovation cooperation shows that international coop-
eration exerts a significantly positive effect on innovation performance, while national
cooperation remains insignificant. If knowledge-oriented motives are predominant
in international cooperation because of the higher likelihood to find technologically
high-qualified partners internationally, then it is not astonishing that the impact of
international cooperation on innovation shows to be significantly larger than that of
national cooperation.
Our results have two main policy implications. First, the engagement in some coop-
eration projects appears to exert a positive influence on firm innovation output; thus
policy instruments that promote innovation cooperation may contribute to an increase
of innovation output. Second, the choice of cooperation partner—national or inter-
national—matters. Notably, while the effectiveness of policy instruments fostering
national cooperation agreements is questionable, instruments that facilitate interna-
tional cooperation clearly increase innovation output. Potential instruments include
fiscal facilitation and/or subsidies that encourage involvement in such projects (see,
e.g., Audretsch et al. 2002).
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